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Article 4

THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE: EVALUATING
ITS JURISDICTIONAL STATUS

Susan Bandes*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A close, critical look at the underpinnings of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is overdue. Rooker-Feldman,which joined the ranks of forum
allocation doctrines as recently as 1983,1 possesses several characteristics that make critical attention especially important. The doctrine has
emerged as perhaps the primary docket-clearing workhorse for the
federal courts, leading to the dismissal of about five hundred cases in
the last seven years. 2 What is most troubling about the reliance of the
lower federal courts on this doctrine is the disjunction between its
heavy use and the lack of attention or articulation the doctrine has
been accorded. Its rapid rise and expansion occurred almost entirely
below the radar. In the sixteen years of the doctrine's existence, the
Supreme Court has barely commented on it. It may be a measure of
the doctrine's status with the High Court thatJustice Scalia referred to
it in the Pennzoil case as the "so called Rooker-Feldman doctrine."3 Federal courts scholars and casebook authors, most likely taking their cue

Professor of Law, DePaul University. I wish to thank Erwin Ghemerinsky and
Bill Marshall for their incisive comments on earlier drafts, my co-panelists Jack
Beermann, Barry Friedman, and Suzanna Sherry for their excellent comments on the
Article and for a wonderfully collegial exchange of views, and Tom Rowe for making
it all possible. Thanks also to Rebecca Morse andJessica Thomas for their research
assistance.
1 The doctrine is based on the cases of Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). However, in Rooker itself, the doctrine was narrowly defined, see infra notes 19-28 and
accompanying text, and in the sixty years between Rooker and Feldman, courts rarely
relied on Rooker to dismiss cases.
2 See Suzanna Sherry, JudicialFederalism in the Trenches: The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine in Action, 74 NoTRm DAME L. R v. 1085 (1999).
3 Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 18 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
*
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from the Supreme Court's lack of attention to the doctrine, have
4
themselves given it little or no attention.
The development of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has suffered
from the lack of attention. A review of many of the lower court opinions5 reflects that the lower courts, in attempting to delineate the doctrine's scope, have spawned a complex, confusing, and sometimes
contradictory body of precedent. Much of this precedent finds the

doctrine applicable in contexts that arguably extend well beyond what
the Supreme Court has thus far authorized, and certainly extend beyond what any defensible rationale for the doctrine would support.
Although the opinions at times attempt to grapple with the doctrine's
complexities, often the reasoning is sparse and unhelpful. In short,
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides the rationale for a significant
amount of forum shifting, and the rationale is unaccompanied by sufficient thought or articulation.
The forum shift is of particular concern because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is held to be of jurisdictional magnitude. When a litigant brings federal claims subsequent to a state court suit, the filing of
the second suit raises several possibilities. One is that he is engaging
in redundant relitigation of an identical issue and ought to be precluded on nonjurisdictional grounds. Another is that he is bringing a
new, federal cause of action which is not redundant and which the
federal court has jurisdiction to consider as an original matter. The
third possibility is that he is complaining of the result in the state
court suit and asking the federal court to entertain an appeal of that
4 Since the 1983 decision in Feldman,there have been a handful of student notes
and comments addressing the doctrine. See Benjamin Smith, Note, Texaco, Inc. v.
Pennzoil, Inc: Beyond a Crude Analysis of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine's Preclusion of
FederalJurisdiction, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 627 (1987); Gary Thompson, Note, The
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and the Subject MatterJurisdictionof Federal District Courts, 42
RUTGERS L. REV. 858 (1990). Some articles on topics like preclusion briefly mention
the doctrine. SeeJack Beermann, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism and State Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 277, 340-45 (1988); Howard M.
Erichson, InterjurisdictionalPreclusion,
96 MICH. L. REV. 945, 973, nn.129-34 (1998); see
also Michael Finch & Jerome Kasriel, Federal Court Correction of State Court Error: The
Singular Case on Interstate Custody Disputes, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 927, 973-77 (1987). For
federal courts casebooks discussing the doctrine, see RIcHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL.,
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

1500-04 (4th ed.

1996) [hereinafter

HART & WECHSLER]; MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 575-84 (4th ed. 1998).

5 Many of these are actually very brief unpublished dispositions. For example, of
39 Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decisions on Rooker-Feldman grounds between
January 1996 and September 1998, 26 were one- or two-page unpublished

dispositions.
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result. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust 6 stood for the narrow and uncontroversial principle that a federal district court is not the proper place for
parties to appeal issues actually decided against them in state court.
This principle, for reasons I will examine in detail, is termed jurisdictional. Once this third and last possibility is broadly construed to encompass settings beyond the narrow Rooker situation, it becomes very
difficult to distinguish it from the first and second possibilities. Yet,
only the third possibility invokes a jurisdictional bar against federal
jurisdiction, and thus it must be distinguished from the first two possibilities with care.
Why does it matter whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional in nature? It matters very much if the doctrine has been
used to shift hundreds of cases to state court that would otherwise
have been decided in federal court. But if Barry Friedman is correct,
most of these cases would have been barred from federal court on
preclusion or abstention grounds. 7 Unfortunately, there is no reliable
way of determining how many such cases would have proceeded absent the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. However, when cases are dismissed
under ajurisdictional doctrine which would otherwise be dismissed or
postponed under a nonjurisdictional doctrine, this decision has consequences of its own.
Courts routinely profess that due to the doctrine's inflexible jurisdictional nature, they have no choice but to dismiss under Rooker-Feldman.8 If the doctrine is jurisdictional, that status has several obvious
consequences. Courts have a duty to raise Rooker-Feldman problems
sua sponte. 9 The Rooker-Feldmanbar is not waivable by the parties. It
requires the application of federal law to determine its applicability,
and thus will sometimes require federal dismissal though dismissal
would not have been necessary under state law. 10 Unlike such forum
allocation doctrines as Younger abstention" or preclusion,' 2 Rooker6 263 U.S. 413 (1923)
7 See Barry Friedman &James E. Gaylord, Rooker-Feldman From the Ground Up,
74 NoTRE DAmE L. REV. 1129 (1999).
8 See GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993); In
re Goetzman, 91 F.3d 1173 (8th Cir. 1996).

9 See Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1364-65 (7th Cir. 1996).
10 See Beermann, supra note 4, at 340-48.
11 See Guarino v. Larsen, 11 F.3d 1151, 1159 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that questions of inadequate state forum that would be relevant in an abstention context are
not relevant in the jurisdictional Rooker-Feldman context).
12 See Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843, 862-63, n.2 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(Fletcher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that Rooker-Feldman,
unlike res judicata, is a jurisdictional, nonwaivable bar). Though California recognizes a public interest exception to the resjudicata doctrine, see Bates, 131 F.3d at 845,
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Feldman is inflexible, and may not contain the exceptions that soften
those doctrines, like the full and fair hearing or public interest exceptions. Because of its jurisdictional status, it is said to trump nonjurisdictional policies like the preference for a federal forum in civil rights
cases.

13

The doctrine's jurisdictional status also has more subtle and pervasive consequences. It gives courts implicit permission to fail to discuss the policies inherent in the decision to deny jurisdiction, on the
apparent theory that since the doctrine is mandatory, such policies
are irrelevant. To put it another way, it gives the illusion of a lack of
judicial choice and responsibility. Moreover, it seems to obviate the
need to balance the doctrine against countervailing doctrines. This is
a predictable consequence when Rooker-Feldman faces off against nonjurisdictional doctrines, like preclusion and abstention, but less so
when the conflict arises from interpretation of the jurisdictional mandates of 28 U.S.C. § 133114 and § 1343.15 The doctrine's jurisdictional
status also has potentially devastating consequences for 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, the primary vehicle for the litigation of federal constitutional
claims, which, though not itself a jurisdictional statute, is inseparably
intertwined with various jurisdictional rules, both statutory and
judicial.
Although for some time those jurists and commentators who focused on the doctrine tended to dismiss it as harmless,1 6 salutary,1 7 or
interchangeable with preclusion doctrines,1 8 it has become clear that
it is neither harmless nor interchangeable. As long as its jurisdictional
underpinnings go unexamined, it will be difficult to assess whether
the doctrine is being wrongly construed or whether the harms it
causes are justified. Thus, my focus in this Article will be on evaluatsuch an exception would not be possible for a jurisdictional bar like the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See also Blake A. Snider, Recent Case, Ninth Circuit Ignores Principlesof
Federalismand the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Bates v. Jones, 21 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
881, 893 (1998) (arguing that the court should have used the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
to which a public interest exception would have been inapplicable).
13 See Williamson B.C. Chang, Rediscovering the Rooker Doctrine: Section 1983, Res
Judicata and the Federal Courts, 31 HASTINGs L.J. 1337 (1980).

14 The general federal question statute. See infra note 26.
15 The statute providing jurisdiction in civil rights cases. See infra note 26.
16 Wright, Miller, and Cooper observe that "no substantial harm seems to have
been done by the jurisdictional cases" but nevertheless finds the jurisdictional approach "unnecessary and potentially mischievous." 18 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 4469 at 665-66, 668 (1981).
17 See David P. Currie, ResJudicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 317,
321-25 (1978).
18 See Chang, supra note 13, at 1354.
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ing the doctrine's jurisdictional pedigree. My thesis is that the RookerFeldman doctrine can claim jurisdictional status only in the very narrow situations in which litigants ask the federal courts to rehear issues
identical to those on which they have already obtained state court decisions or, in other words, those situations in which an appeal would
lie.1 9
II.

ROO ER FELDMAN'S JURISDICTIONAL STATUS: JUDICIAL AND
SCHOLARLY REASONING

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust20 stood for the narrow and uncontroversial
principle that a federal district court is not the proper place for parties to appeal issues actually decided against them in state court. The
case dealt with a circuit court judgment from the state of Indiana,
which was affirmed by the state's supreme court after a full hearing.
The same parties then appeared in federal district court, where the
unsuccessful state court litigant argued that the judgment violated the
Fourteenth Amendment because it gave effect to an unconstitutional
statute and conflicted with prior state case law. The court dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal,
stating:
Under the legislation of Congress, no court of the United States
other than this Court could entertain a proceeding to reverse or
modify the judgment for errors of that character. To do so would be
an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The jurisdiction possessed by
21
the District Courts is strictly original.
Rocker, then, held only that federal district courts cannot review a
case already decided by the state's highest court, since only the United
States Supreme Court has federal appellate jurisdiction over such
19 Jack Beermann appropriately inquires why I would advocate maintaining the
doctrine at all, even in this narrow form, since all of its legitimate functions can be
better served by preclusion doctrines. See Jack M. Beermann, Comments on RookerFeldman or Let State Law Be Our Guide, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1209 (1999). To

clarify, I do not advocate maintaining the doctrine. I agree with Beermann's conclusion that it is superfluous, and, as I argue herein, I think it is also harmful to the
extent that it does anything more than bar suits that are facially styled as appeals. As
to that very limited set of federal suits, I maintain only that the doctrine does no harm
and states a rather obvious principle of nonappealability. However, I have no stake in
winning the argument that Rooker-Feldman should be maintained for those suits. I'd
prefer to see the federal courts adopt Beermann's argument, and jettison the doctrine entirely. However, I am not hopeful.
20 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
21 Id. at 416 (citations omitted).
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claims. 2 2 The decision was cited sporadically in the following years,
and was often mentioned interchangeably with res judicata.2 3 Then
Williamson B.C. Chang wrote an article criticizing post-Rooker courts
for interpreting the case too narrowly. 24 Chang argued that Rooker
was jurisdictionally based and could therefore be used more effectively than preclusion to create exceptions to § 1983. His argument
25
proved influential.
According to Chang, Rooker had three rationales, two statutory
and one prudential. The statutory rationales arise from the grants of
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court and the federal district courts. 28
U.S.C. § 125726 grants the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction to review the judgments of the highest state courts. By inference, no other
court, including a federal district court, has the power to do so. Nor
has Congress given the lower federal courts power to review state
courtjudgments. 28 U.S.C. § 133127 grants the federal district courts
only original jurisdiction. This limitation, says Chang, is an obvious
corollary of the grant to the Supreme Court of exclusive power to review state courtjudgments. "The term 'original' . . clearly negates, as
a matter of statutory construction, any implied 'appellate' jurisdiction" of the federal district courts. 28 In addition to these statutory
foundations for the doctrine, Chang presents a third nonstatutory ra22 See also Developments in the Law-§ 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133,
1334 n.14 (1977) (noting that dismissal under Rooker is inappropriate unless it appeared on the face of the complaint that plaintiff sought appellate review of a state
court judgment).
23 See Thompson, supra note 4, at 863-71.
24 See Chang, supra note 13.
25 Indeed, Chang's arguments may have proven influential in ways he did not
intend. It is important to note that Chang wanted to use Rooker to accomplish some
specific objectives that were later accomplished through other, nonjurisdictional
means. At the time of the article, it appeared to him that courts might permit a
blanket § 1983 exception to resjudicata. He wanted to see both Rooker and resjudicata principles merged into one doctrine that would allow preclusion of such claims.
His article predated developments in preclusion law itself, and also, inter alia, Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), Migra v. Warren, 465 U.S. 75 (1984), and the many extensions of the Younger doctrine. These decisions more than meet the objectives
Chang argued the Rooker-Feldman doctrine ought to accomplish.
26 And its precursor, Judicial Code § 238, cited in Rooker. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at
415.
27 Section 1331 is the general federal question statute. Section 1331's utility was
limited by its jurisdictional amount requirements, which were finally eliminated in
1980. Section 1343 was passed concurrently with § 1983 as its jurisdictional counterpart, and the jurisdictional statute tracks the language of the remedial one. Section
1343 was an important vehicle until § 1331 was amended in 1980, since it had no
jurisdictional amount requirement.
28 Chang, supra note 13, at 1349.
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tionale: system consistency. Trial courts should not be able to annul
29
each others' judgments on the merits.
Two years later, the Court decided District of Columbia Court ofAppeals v. Feldman.3 0 In that case, the plaintiffs sought waivers of the
District's requirement that, in order for a member of the bar of another state to waive in to the District of Columbia bar, he must have
graduated from an accredited law school. When the D.C. Court of
Appeals3 ' denied their petitions, they alleged in federal district court
that refusal to waive the rule violated their constitutional and federal
statutory rights. The Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims
that their petitions had been wrongly denied, citing a lack of subject
matterjurisdiction. It held that the D.C. Court of Appeals had already
adjudicated plaintiffs' claims on the merits, and therefore a federal
district court determination of the same issues would amount to an
appeal.
Thus, Feldman resuscitated Rooker.3 2 More significantly, it expanded Rooker's rather innocuous principle that lower federal courts
have no appellate jurisdiction over state supreme court decisions. It
extended the principle to many situations in which a litigant seeks to
raise a claim in federal court that had been raised but not explicitly
decided in state court.3 3 It also engendered questions about whether
the principle extended to issues that had not been raised in state
court, but could have been, or even to parties not present in state
court. To aid the federal courts in making decisions of ajurisdictional
magnitude on these issues, it rather cursorily made two rules of applicability which have since sorely perplexed lower courts: the distinction
between judicial and nonjudicial acts, and the extension to issues that
were inextricably intertwined with those decided in state court.

29

See id.

30 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
31

This court is treated as the highest state court of the District under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1257.
32 Just prior to the Feldman decision, the Fifth Circuit had come close to repudiating the doctrine entirely. See Thompson, supra note 4, at 870-71.
33 Rooker barred a federal action "[i]f the constitutional questions stated in the
bill actually arose in the [state] cause." Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415. In Feldman, the plaintiffs raised several statutory and constitutional arguments, none of which were addressed in the Court of Appeals' per curiam opinion. The Supreme Court held that
the Court of Appeals had determined as a legal matter that the plaintiffs were not
entitled to sit for the bar, and that this question could not be relitigated in federal
court. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 480-82.
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A. JudicialActs Requirement
Though it rejected the federal challenge to the plaintiffs' own
denial of admission to the D.C. bar, the Supreme Court permitted the
lower federal court to consider the plaintiffs' general challenges to
the constitutionality of the bar admission rules. Feldman held:
Challenges to the constitutionality of state bar rules... do not necessarily require a United States district court to review a final statecourt judgment in ajudicial proceeding. Instead, the district court
may simply be asked to assess the validity of a rule promulgated in a
nonjudicial proceeding. If this is the case, the district court is not
reviewing a state-court judicial decision. In this regard, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257 does not act as a bar to the district court's consideration of
the case and because the proceedings giving rise to the rule are
nonjudicial the policies prohibiting... district court review of final
state-court judgments are not implicated.... [United States district
courts] do not have jurisdiction, however, over challenges to statecourt decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was
unconstitutional. Review of those decisions may be had only in this
34
Court. [Citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257] .
The Court reasoned that 28 U.S.C. § 1257 stands for the proposition that only the Supreme Court (and by implication not the lower
federal courts) can review state court decisions. When a party seeks
review of a rule that is not a state court decision, but rather a legislative
or administrative decision, the policies underlying the Supreme
Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction are not implicated. Thus, to
the extent the D.C. Court of Appeals acted administratively in promulgating general bar admission standards, its actions were nonjudicial
and did not need to be "appealed" through the state court system.
That is, a rule promulgated by a nonjudicial state body can be challenged in federal court-or at least will not be barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine. It thus becomes necessary to determine what constitutes a judicial body. In the case of an institution like the D.C. Court
of Appeals, which wears judicial and ministerial hats, the identification is not always obvious. The Court offered the following language
to aid in line drawing:
The... Court of Appeals did not "look to the future and change
existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to
all or some part of those subject to its power." ... Instead, the proceedings . . . involved a 'Judicial inquiry" in which the court was
called upon to investigate, declare, and enforce "liabilities as they
34

Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486.
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[stood] on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to
exist."

35

However, once the state court, in its judicial capacity, determines
the legality of the legislative or administrative rule, that state court
decision is considered judicial in nature and cannot be appealed to
the federal district courts. Thus, if the D.C. Court of Appeals had
actually decided the merits of Feldman's general challenge to the
D.C. bar admission rules, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would have
barred federal relitigation of that decision as an appeal from a state
36
judicial determination.
B.

Inextricably Intertwined Requirement

But what of claims that were not explicitly mentioned in the state
court's judicial opinion? Feldman extended Rocker by barring reconsideration of claims that were implicitly decided, as well. Feldman's
second rule of applicability was the "inextricably intertwined" test,
which Justice Brennan introduced in a footnote. He explained that:
If the constitutional claims presented to a United States district
court are inextricably intertwined with the state court's denial in a
judicial proceeding of a particular plaintiff's application for admission to the state bar, then the district court is in essence being
called upon to review
the state-court decision. This the district
37
court may not do.
Unfortunately, nothing in Feldman explains the rationale for the
language or gives any indication of its proper scope.
C. Federalism
Thus far, we have established that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is
purportedly based on interpretation of two jurisdictional statutes: 28
U.S.C. § 1257 and § 1331. Yet it is often referred to as a decision
about federalism.3 8 Is this merely a reference to the purposes of the
jurisdictional statutes, or a suggestion that the doctrine also has a non35 Id. at 479 (citations omitted).
36 As Thompson points out, this caveat should apply only to issues that were
raised or inextricably intertwined with issues actually decided in state court, and not
to issues that merely could have been raised, since the latter are not in a position to
be appealed. In Feldman's case, the plaintiff could have raised the general challenge
to the bar rules in state court but did not do so, and the Supreme Court allowed the
challenge to go forward nevertheless. See Thompson, supra note 4, at 876-77.
37 Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n.16.
38 See, e.g., Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464 (11th Cir. 1996); Chang, supra note 13, at
1377; Sherry, supra note 2.
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statutory, prudential source? Professor Chang argued, shortly before
the decision in Feldman, that the nonstatutory basis of the doctrine was
system consistency. As he rather awkwardly put it, "if trial courts could
readily annul the judgments of each other on the merits, the prereq39 Of
uisite of finality in the judicial system would be destroyed."
course, this argument applies equally to resjudicata, and as stated has
no intersystemic component. 40 Chang immediately went on to say
that the lower federal courts cannot enlarge their jurisdiction and the
Supreme Court cannot grant its exclusive jurisdiction to the lower federal courts, 4 1 but this is simply a repetition of the statutory arguments
he made earlier. Thus, when Chang refers to the doctrine as an "obligatory, statutorily-based expression of federalism," 42 he appears to
mean that by maintaining adherence to 28 U.S.C. § 1257 and § 1331,
the doctrine ensures that the federal and state systems remain sovereign, with the Supreme Court the sole federal court with the power to
rule on federal questions raised in either forum. 43
The Feldman case has very little to say about federalism or prudential concerns. It talks mainly about the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The exceptions occur in the footnote referred to earlier, which
mentions two concerns. The first, widely ignored in subsequent cases,
might have suggested that the narrow context in which the case arose
was important. Justice Brennan noted that "it is important to note in
the context of this case the strength of the state interest in regulating
the state bar." 44 The note also contains language that, though in context directed at the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction, has been
widely cited outside that context:
By failing to raise his claims in state court a plaintiff may forfeit his
right to obtain review of the state-court decision in any federal
court. This result is eminently defensible on policy grounds. We
39 Chang, supra note 13, at 1350.
40 Wright, Miller, and Cooper note that its logical corollary would be "that as
between two federal district courts resjudicata is a matter ofjurisdiction, since exclusive jurisdiction for appellate review lies in the courts of appeals." WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 15, § 4469, at 666.
41 See Chang, supra note 13, at 1350.
42 Id. at 1341.

43 Currie suspects that:
[T] he Supreme Court was chosen to review state court judgments because only it had sufficient dignity to make federal review of state courts

reasonably palatable; that the highest-state-court requirement was designed
to preclude federal interference unless and until state courts had had a full
opportunity to avoid that clash ....
Currie, supra note 17, at 323.
44 Feldman, 460 U.S. at 484 n.16.
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have noted the competence of state courts to adjudicatefederal constitutional
45

claims.

This language is often cited in Rooker-Feldman cases for the general proposition of federal-state court parity.46 Though it is not at all
clear that Feldman itself meant federalism to play any role beyond that
played by the jurisdictional statutes, federalism has evolved into an
additional, if amorphously defined, makeweight in the argument for
barring federal jurisdiction.
In sum, lower courts presented with the newly minted Rooker-Feldman doctrine were handed a very powerful weapon of forum reallocation, and given very little guidance for using it. The jurisdictional
nature of the doctrine means that courts either find it highly inflexible, or are readily able to claim inflexibility when they desire to do so.
Courts routinely announce that the doctrine is mandatory and leaves
them no choice but to dismiss.4 7 This means that the doctrine can be
claimed to trump all sorts of other policies, like the importance of a
federal forum in constitutional cases. It is possible to isolate many
specific examples of the consequences of calling Rooker-Feldman a jurisdictional doctrine. The Seventh Circuit noted that unlike res judicata, Rooker-Feldman contains no limitation in cases in which the
federal plaintiff had no adequate opportunity to address the claim in
the state action, 48 and the Eighth Circuit noted that the doctrine contains no procedural due process exception. 49 Similarly, the Third Circuit assumed that Rooker-Feldman precluded federal review of a
decision by a state court to put one of its own judges on senior status
despite his constitutional objections. It noted that while a state court
decision on the legality of its own actions might be held as too biased
to justify abstention, it seemed to comport with Rooker-Feldman.50 In
the Ninth Circuit, in a major challenge to Proposition 140 (imposing
term limits on certain officeholders), the federal court held it had
jurisdiction pursuant to California's public interest exception to pre45

Id. (emphasis added).

46 See, e.g., Kirby v. City of Philadelphia, 905 F. Supp. 222, 226 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
47 See, e.g., Goetzman v. Agribank, FCB, 91 F.3d 1173 (8th Cir. 1996); GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993).
48 See Gary v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1367 n.8 (7th Cir. 1996). Although other circuits have held that a full and fair hearing is required for Rooker-Feldman to apply, see
Wood v. Orange County, 715 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1983), the parameters of this
exception to the jurisdictional rule are rarely discussed.
49 See Goetzman, 91 F.3d at 1178.
50 See Guarino v. Larsen, 11 F.3d 1151, 1159 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993). The court noted
that although the state court opinion contained no discussion of the issues, this was
not problematic since the opinion barring Feldman from taking the bar contained no
discussion either.

1186

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 74:4

clusion doctrines, despite the fact that the state supreme court had
decided the same issue in a case involving different parties. Two
judges argued that the federal case should have been dismissed under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which would not have allowed such an
51
exception.
The consequences of Rooker-Feldman'sjurisdictional status extend
well beyond these specific instances. More basically, the jurisdictional
label acts as a powerful trump card and changes, for the worse, the
very delicate balance that previously existed between the protection of
federal constitutional rights and state autonomy. 5 2 The elaborate in-

terplay-congressional and judicial-between § 1983 on the one
hand and the Full Faith and Credit Act on the other, between nationalist decisions like Patsy v. Board of Regents53 and Mitchum v. Foster54 on
the one hand, and federalist decisions like Allen v. McCury5 5 and
Younger v. Harris56 on the other,5 7 is an interplay of nonjurisdictional
statutes and judicial interpretations. Rooker-Feldman's introduction
into the mix has the potential to greatly weaken § 1983 and therefore
to hobble, without adequate justification, the federal protection of
federal constitutional rights.
The consequences of the skewed balance are seen not just in major federal court of appeals decisions which attempt, albeit with difficulty, to reason through the doctrine's requisites. Federal district
courts, and even courts of appeal, are using the doctrine to assert, in
Robert Cover's memorable phrase, 'Jurisdictional helplessness."5 8 In
a recent period of nearly three years, two-thirds of the thirty-nine Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decisions resting on the Rooker-Feldman
51 See Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843, 855-59 (9th Cir. 1997) (Rymer, J., concurring); see also Snider, supra note 12.

52 Ironically, though Rooker-Feldman undercuts federal supervision of state court
enforcement of federal law, it simultaneously, as Beermann points out, strikes a blow
againststate autonomy, to the extent it insists on the use of federal standards to determine the effect of state decisions. See Beermann, supra note 19, at 1227-33.
53 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (holding that plaintiffs need not exhaust state remedies
before filing a § 1983 suit in federal court).
54 407 U.S. 225 (1972) (holding § 1983 is an expressly authorized exception to

the Anti-Injunction Act).
55

449 U.S. 90 (1980) (holding that a state court decision on a constitutional issue

will preclude federal judicial consideration of that issue, assuming a full and fair state

hearing).
56 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (holding that federal injunctions against pending state
criminal proceedings are barred on prudential grounds).
57 See Thompson, supra note 4, at 917.
58 ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
236 (1975).
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doctrine were one or two page unpublished dispositions. Many of
these dispositions contain little more than boilerplate assertions that
federal courts have no jurisdiction to review or modify state court
judgments, that a dissatisfied litigant may not seek reversal of a state
court judgment simply by casting his complaint in the form of a civil
rights action, and that "that in essence is what... [the plaintiff] has
done here." 59
As Justice Stevens argued in his lone dissent in Feldman, however,
it isn't at all clear why this doctrine should be termed jurisdictional.
He pointed out that federal district courts do have original jurisdiction over federal question suits and are authorized to entertain collateral attacks upon the unconstitutional application of state rules. He
stated succinctly that "[t]he Court's opinion fails to distinguish between two concepts: appellate review and collateral attack. ' 60 I believe
he was correct in his conclusion that there may be many reasons to
deny access to the federal courts for such collateral attacks, but that
these reasons are simply not of jurisdictional magnitude. Moreover,
the so-called jurisdictional mandate of Rooker-Feldman conflicts with
other jurisdictional mandates-those of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and
§ 1343,61 which reflect a congressional judgment that state court vehicles for the vindication of federal rights and interests are inadequate. 62 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a dangerous combination of
the mandatory inflexibility that comes with being billed as jurisdictional and the tremendous flexibility inherent in interpreting its applicability. Most dangerous, without a coherent theory for why, when,
and how this blunderbuss doctrine is jurisdictional, it is impossible to
make, with any semblance of fairness, system consistency, or credibility, the interpretive decisions required to apply it.
59 Berntson v. Indiana Div. of Family and Children, No. 98-1024, 1998 WL
567951, at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 18, 1998). See also Kren v. City of Springfield, 142 F.3d

440 (7th Cir. 1998).
60 Feldman, 460 U.S. at 490 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61 Beermann's response to this argument is extremely well taken. I am particularly grateful for his insight that § 1343 provides the much stronger argument, since
Rooker-Feldman is styled only as a limitation flowing from § 1331. As to his argument
that § 1331 cannot be used to argue against a doctrine which is itself premised on
§ 1331, he is correct that we are essentially left to arguments about the proper reach
and interpretation of the statute. One such argument is that Rooker-Feldman'sclaim to
be linked to § 1331 is based solely on negative inferences, not on any language or
legislative history in the statute itself, whereas § 1331 is a sweeping affirmativegrant of
jurisdiction, based on congressional intent to alter the federal/state balance in a way
distinctly contrary to the effects of Rooker-Feldman. See Beermann, supra note 19, at

1227-33.
62 See Currie, supra note 17, at 320.
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EXAMINING THE ROOKER-FELDMANDocTRINE'S CIMMS OF
JURISDIU-7IONAL STATUS

Rooker-Feldman's jurisdictional pedigree is said to rest on jurisdictional statutes-28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1257-and on its advancement of the policies of federalism. No commentator or court has
claimed that the doctrine has constitutional status under Article 111.63
Before turning to an evaluation of the doctrine's claimed statutory
and policy bases, I want to briefly consider whether it advances or inhibits Article III's jurisdictional aims.
To the extent Rooker-Feldman funnels the federal questions raised
in state cases to the United States Supreme Court, it arguably advances the interest in a uniform interpretation of federal law. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court so rarely grants certiorari that this notion
of uniformity is more aspirational than actual, but permitting the
lower federal courts to review state court resolution of federal questions wouldn't significantly advance the uniformity goal either.64 But
what of the other values advanced by Article III jurisdiction, specifically the values that attach to the use of the federal forum for resolution of federal claims? These are rarely mentioned in discussions of
the doctrine. Article III courts have attributes that set them apart
from state courts-the life tenure and salary protection that help insulate federal judges from majoritarian pressures and assist them in enforcing unpopular rights. It is not necessary to revive the endless
parity debate in order to conclude that the Constitution made federal
courts tribunals of limited jurisdiction, with certain characteristics that
would enable them to perform their special role. Rooker-Feldmanjuris63 Thus there seems to be no jurisdictional bar to the ability of Congress to give
the lower federal courts appellate jurisdiction over state court claims. This is one way
of characterizing what it did with habeas jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994);
James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time? The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpusi
Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2008 n.46 (1992); see also Ritter v. Ross,
992 F.2d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1993). Alternatively, habeas is often characterized as an
original civil action distinct from the state criminal action. See HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 4, at 1357-58.
64 It would provide one more opportunity for a grant of certiorari. Some jurists
and commentators seem to suggest that having a federal standard for determining
whether the federal suit is barred, rather than looking to state law as preclusion demands, is itself a means of advancing uniformity. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 17, at
324. But given the lack of Supreme Court guidance on the subject, we currently have
multiple federal court decisions with no uniformity and very little articulation. If the
argument is that lower federal court determinations of federal law themselves advance
uniformity, this would seem to support the general proposition that federal courts
should be determining the substantive federal questions themselves rather than deferring to state court decisions on federal law.
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prudence, for all its discussion of comity, federalism, and the independence of the sovereigns, by and large fails to acknowledge that the
possibility that the federal courts might decide a federal issue differendy from the state courts is not necessarily an affront to federalism.
Rather, it may be consistent with the intent of Article

111.65

Congress has the responsibility for determining the precise contours of federal jurisdiction and Rooker-Feldman is premised on the notion that Congress has defined those contours, through 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257 and § 1331, to preclude lower federal courts from hearing appeals from state court decisions. 66 The next step, then, is to examine
these statutes and assess whether this premise bears scrutiny.
28 U.S.C. § 1257 provides that the Supreme Court may review
judgments or decrees rendered by the "highest state court in which a
decision could be had," when a federal question is raised therein.
This requirement is directed at ensuring that state courts have the
opportunity to fully and completely adjudicate federal issues without
premature federal interference. 67 This is in part a concern for developing an adequate factual record, in part a desire to permit state
courts to find narrowing constructions or, in general, have the first
opportunity to consider a state statute's constitutionality, 68 and in part
a means of ensuring that the state processes have the full opportunity
69
to run their course.
Section 1257 itself does not directly speak to the issue of whether
a lower federal court can review a state court claim. 70 The bar against
federal jurisdiction is created through what one commentator calls
65

See Susan Bandes, Monell, Parratt, Daniels and Davidson: Distinguishinga Cus-

tom or Policy from a Random, Unauthorized Act, 72 IowA L. REv. 101, 120-27 (1986)
[hereinafter Bandes, UnauthorizedAct]; Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 227, 281-92 (1990) [hereinafter Bandes, The Idea of a Case].
66 There is also the question of whether the power of Congress is plenary, for
example whether Congress could create a doctrine like Rooker-Feldman if it would deprive plaintiffs of any forum in which to litigate due process or equal protection
claims. Whether there are such limitations on the power of Congress to shape the
lower federal courts' jurisdiction is a question that has spawned a rich literature. See
Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REv.

289, 300 n.38 (1995) (citing sources). See also the recent symposium in Issue 7 of 86
(1998).
See Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437 (1969).

GEORGETOWN LJ.

67

68 See id.
69 See Currie, supra note 17, at 323.
70 Moreover, in the direct appeal context § 1257's finality requirement has been
interpreted with a fair degree of flexibility toward countervailing concerns. See Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); HART & WECHSLER, supranote 4, at
636-41 (discussing the exceptions to the finality requirement).
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the "two negative inferences." 71 The first is implied from § 1257: that
because Congress restricted the Supreme Court to hearing appeals
from the highest state court in order to allow state courts to complete
their processes, lower federal courts are also barred from hearing
claims decided by the lower state courts. The second negative inference, arising from 28 U.S.C. § 1331, completes the picture: even once
state processes have run their course, the Supreme Court has exclusive federal jurisdiction to review claims decided in state court. Lower
federal courts, by inference, have no such jurisdiction. 72 Thus, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine can be said to rest on the requisites of the

73
jurisdictional statutes only if these inferences are correct.

To begin, it is not clear why § 1257 should apply to preclude federal review of the decisions of lower state courts. As one commentator
noted, in light of the highest state court requirement, Rooker-Feldman's
"preclusive effect would seem to be activated only once the state's
highest court has rendered some type of decision." 7 4 But the doctrine
has generally been read more broadly to impose a requirement that a
lower state court decision be appealed through the state system and to
the Supreme Court-in short, an exhaustion requirement.7 5 As I will
discuss below, this extension is problematic in light of the courts' difficulty in distinguishing an appeal from an original action under the
Rooker-Feldman criteria, since the exhaustion requirement, when im-

71
72

See Smith, supra note 4, at 641.
See id.; Port Auth. PBA v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & NJ., 973 F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir.

1992).
73 Moreover, although the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is said to rest on § 1257'sjurisdictional requirement that the Supreme Court cannot hear federal claims not raised
below, it is not settled whether this requirement is itself jurisdictional or prudential.
See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 567 (citing Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S.
519, 533 (1992)).
74 Smith, supra note 4, at 640.
75 See, e.g., PortAuthority, 973 F.2d at 177; see also Garry v. Geils, 82 F.2d 1362, 1368
(7th Cir. 1996) (holding that if plaintiffs desired to challenge condemnation action as
unconstitutional, they should have done so through the Illinois condemnation process and ultimately to the U.S. Supreme Court). The Feldman court suggested that
this requirement prevents litigants from circumventing the dictates of § 1257 simply
by failing to raise their claims in state court. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16; see also
Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416; Currie, supranote 17, at 323 (arguing that district court relief

would undermine § 1257's requirement that an attack upon a state judgment be
timely filed). But this argument begs the question of why an exhaustion requirement
should be imposed in a situation in which a federal plaintiff would otherwise have
concurrent federal jurisdiction over federal claims.
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posed to preclude federal district courts from hearing § 1983 cases,
76
directly conflicts with that statute's nonexhaustion requirement.
In addition, it is not clear why a jurisdictional rule that by its
terms is directed at the United States Supreme Court's jurisdiction
should be transposed to regulate the federal district courts. Section
1257 is directed at ensuring that state courts have the opportunity to
fully and completely adjudicate federal issues without premature federal interference. Yet the federal district courts possess attributes and
duties different from those of the United States Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, sits to correct errors below and has no fact-finding capabilities. The federal district courts possess original jurisdiction over federal claims and do
have independent fact-finding capabilities. Thus, the need for a fully
developed record is not relevant to the federal district courts' jurisdiction. It would be relevant if they were hearing appeals, but of course
they are not permitted to hear appeals, only original actions.
It also appears that the Supreme Court in the direct appeal context has a narrower interpretation of what constitutes an original action than it often does in the Rooker-Feldman context. It is telling to
examine some of the instances in which the Supreme Court, in interpreting § 1257, has refused to hear claims that it deemed to be separate from those raised in state court. For example, in Yee v. City of
Escondido,7 7 the Court deemed that an argument that a rent control
ordinance constituted a regulatory taking was separate from a claim
that the ordinance violated substantive due process. Likewise, in Bailey v. Anderson,7 8 the Court ruled that a state court challenge to the
denial of interest in a condemnation action could not be converted
into a federal constitutional question under the Just Compensation
Clause. Yet in the Rooker-Feldman context, federal constitutional challenges to condemnation, foreclosure, or other state restrictions on
property are routinely dismissed as inextricably intertwined with the
state court decisions, on the ground that a favorable decision on the
79
constitutional issue would negate the state court judgment.
Moreover, even accepting the rather elaborate double negative
inference, it still leads only to the conclusion that the lower federal
courts may not rehear claims that were adjudicated in state court.
This proposition comports with the common understanding of the
76 See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). More accurately, the bar on
federal jurisdiction cannot be called an exhaustion requirement, since it permanently
precludes federal consideration of the issue.

77 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
78 326 U.S. 203 (1945).
79

See, e.g., Garry, 82 F.3d at 1362; Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750 (7th Gir. 1993).
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term "appeal." Rooker itself was consistent with this narrow understanding but beginning with Feldman, the doctrine has been used to
preclude a wide array of claims that differ from claims determined by
state courts. Feldman permitted preclusion of issues not actually decided, and lower courts also preclude issues that were not raised at
all;80 some have even precluded issues by parties not part of the state
court proceeding. 8 1 These extensions do not comport with the requisites of an appeal.
There is a certain cynical spin put on these extensions by the
lower courts, which often refer to a disappointed state plaintiff as filing a federal suit to get around his adverse state judgment.8 2 No
doubt this occurs, but there is a troubling tone to much of the RookerFeldman jurisprudence: it contains an implicit assumption that a federal suit following a state suit must be a less-than-ethical attempt to
manufacture federal jurisdiction. Recall Justice Stevens' point in his
Feldman dissent. He argued that these are all cases in which original
jurisdiction does lie with the lower federal courts. The initial presumption should be in favor of federal court access for federal claims.
If we accept the double negative inference, the federal courts are
divested of their jurisdiction only if the case comes to them as an appeal, rather than a separate and independent proceeding. Thus,
Rooker-Feldman's jurisdictional status rests entirely on the courts' ability
to sort the "appeals from state court judgments" from the independent, original proceedings, a distinction that often seems to rest on the
federal district court's reaction to the way the federal complaint is
83
drafted.
Let me be clear on one point: the fact that the distinction between unauthorized appeals and authorized original actions is not a
bright-line rule is not in itself an argument against the doctrine's jurisdictional status. I would argue that no jurisdictional doctrine is selfdefining-all doctrines leave room for judicial interpretation. But
there are particular problems with this doctrine and the way it has
developed. Courts have too often used the jurisdictional stature of
the doctrine as a convenient way to avoid reasoning through the policies underlying it. Just as the question of what is jurisdictional is not
80 See, e.g., Kirby v. City of Philadelphia, 905 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Powell
v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464 (11th Cir. 1996).
81 See Sherry, supranote 2, at 1112 & n.108. Sherry points out that several lower
courts have precluded nonparty suits even after the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. DeGrandy,512 U.S. 997 (1994), which arguably held the practice impermissible.
82 See, e.g., GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 727 (7th Cir.
1993); Lynk v. LaPorte Superior Court, 789 F.2d 554, 563 (7th Cir. 1986).
83 Thompson, supra note 4, at 882.
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self-defining, the jurisdictional label cannot be substituted for a reasoned inquiry into whether a doctrine's scope is properly tailored to
the purposes it is meant to serve. Let's now turn to a consideration of
the purposes that both the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and its claimed
jurisdictional bases (§ 1331 and § 1257) are meant to serve.
The question of what policies § 1257 advances in the Rooker-Feldman context is often answered in general statements about the importance of preserving the autonomy of both sovereigns and preventing
undue incursions of one upon the other.8 4 What does this mean in
practice? What particularjurisdictional policies are at risk when a federal district court reviews a state court decision? The bar on appeals
might advance goals that are not peculiar to dual sovereignties. It
might simply be a means of regulating claim splitting where it encroaches on values like system consistency, fairness to litigants, preservation of judicial resources, and finality.8 5 These interests could be
adequately served by nonjurisdictional preclusion doctrines.
But much of the language of Rooker-Feldman is imbued with a
rather vaguely expressed concern for federalism. It is important to
speak more precisely about what such a concern entails in order to
determine what effect it should have on the doctrine's proper scope.
As I will illustrate in the following discussion of the 'Judicial in nature"
requirement, the failure of the courts to face the question of what
interests are at stake helps explain the wild divergence in scope that
various districts and circuits have given the doctrine.
A. Judicialin Nature
Feldman almost offhandedly gave federal courts the task of making several distinctions of purportedly jurisdictional magnitude. First,
because the doctrine is based largely on § 1257, which gives the
Supreme Court exclusive federal appellate jurisdiction over state judicial decisions, the federal district court needs to determine whether it
is being asked to review a state judicial decision. Feldman reasoned
that the policies animating § 1257 are not implicated by review of
rules that were notjudicially promulgated, such as statutes adopted by
legislatures or regulations adopted by administrative tribunals. But in
Feldman itself the Court was faced, in part, with an administrative rule
promulgated by the D.C. Court of Appeals, in its administrative capacity.8 6 Thus, in a case like Feldman in which a single tribunal can wear
84 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 4, at 636.
85 See Chang, supra note 13, at 1350.
86 See Friedman, supra note 7, at 1167-73 (discussing the peculiar problems with
attorney discipline cases).
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more than one hat, the identity of the tribunal may not be dispositive.
Courts must look to the type of authority that a tribunal is exercising
in the particular case.
Unfortunately, the Feldman Court, though it claimed to key the
'Judicial in nature" inquiry to the policies implicated by § 1257, did
not identify the particular policies at risk. In a footnote, the Court
mentioned "the desirability of giving the state court the first opportunity to consider a state statute or rule in light of federal constitutional
arguments" and the opportunity of the state court to give the statute a
saving construction. 87 Such considerations may justify an exhaustion
requirement, but not the total preclusion Rooker-Feldman requires. Indeed, these are the same concerns animating the nonjurisdictional
doctrine of Pullman abstention, which, unlike the Rooker-Feldman doc88
trine, permits state court litigants to reserve their federal claims.

Many courts analogize Rooker-Feldman to Younger v. Harris.89
Lower courts justify the extension of the Younger principle from a prohibition on interference with ongoing state actions to a prohibition
on reconsidering completed state actions by reasoning that "if we assume the state court will get it right in an ongoing proceeding, we
should also assume that it did get it right when the proceeding is complete." 90 This reasoning reads out Youngers disinclination to thwart
the state judicial machinery when it is in motion, in favor of a more
broadly stated respect for the competence of state courts. It ignores
the fact that the Younger doctrine is a prudential exception to a jurisdictional doctrine (with exceptions of its own) rather than a distinct
jurisdictional doctrine.
Even when the state's judicial machinery is not in motion, nonintervention could be premised on the desire to show respect for state
courts. But the vagueness of this formulation has been highly problematic. Does it constitute a desire to show respect for state court decisions on particular issues, for state court judgments affecting
particular parties, for state court judgments as a more general matter,
87 Feldman, 460 U.S. at 484 n.16.
88 See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1971); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411 (1964); Feldman, 460 U.S. at 480 n.14
(holding the England reservation procedure inapplicable in Rooker-Feldman cases).
89 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
90 Johnson v. Kansas, 888 F. Supp 1037, 1079 (D. Kan. 1995). See, e.g., Facio v.
Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 545 (10th Cir. 1991). But see Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,
464 (1974) (holding the Younger doctrine inapplicable to federal declaratory actions
against threatened state prosecutions, and holding that "lower federal courts are the
primary and powerful reliances for vindicating constitutional rights").

1999]

EVALUATING

ROOKER-FELDMA.AlS

JURISDICTIONAL STATUS

1195

or for state substantive legislative priorities?91 If it is a desire to show
respect for state court resolution of particular issues, it would seem to
support the rather frightening position taken by Judge Rymer of the
Ninth Circuit in her concurrence in Bates v. Jones.92 In this case,
Judge Rymer argued that a state decision on the constitutionality of
Proposition 140, imposing term limits on certain state officeholders,
precluded a federal challenge to the same act even though it was
brought by different parties in an entirely different case. Or is nonintervention premised on a desire to show respect for state judgments
affecting particular parties, 93 which would preclude using Rooker-Feldman to bar challenges by different parties? Or is it based on a desire
to show respect for the state courtjudgments themselves, regardless of
what issues were raised or decided in state court?9 4 This rationale
might even support a result like that in Kamilewicz, which barred a
federal challenge to a state class action settlement even though the
federal suit alleged that the settlement had been obtained through
fraud and attorney malpractice. 95 Or, for that matter, is the nonintervention principle a very narrow rule applicable in situations in which
the state needs autonomy to protect an important state interest, such
as regulating the state bar?9 6 These various formulations of the pur91

See MARTIN H.

REDISH, FEDERALJURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF

344-45 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing the various possible components of
federalism as a ground for deferring to state courts). Professor Currie, for example,
argues that an original federal action attacking a statejudgment may pose the greatest
conflict, since it would permit a new trial rather than confining review to the state
record. See Currie, supra note 17, at 323-24.
92 131 F.3d 843, 855-59 (9th Cir. 1997) (Rymer, J., concurring).
93 See id. at 862 (Fletcher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
94 Cases like Garry v. Ceils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1367 (7th Cir. 1996), and Ritter v. Ross,
992 F.2d 750, 750 (7th Cir. 1996), reflect the courts' confusion. These cases state the
principle that Rooker-Feldman is activated when a federal plaintiff seeks to overturn a
state court judgment. They attempt to distinguish the situation in which the federal
plaintiff is instead complaining of the actions of the opposing parties in state court.
But as Garry recognized, the harm from the opposing party's actions becomes complete only when upheld by the state court. In the absence of an adverse state court
judgment upholding the opposing party's conduct, presumably the harm inflicted by
the opposing party would generally not continue to be actionable.
95 See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston, 100 F.3d 1348 (7th Cir. 1996).
96 See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 484 n.16; see also Bates, 131 F.3d at 863 (Fletcher, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Feldman is an exemplar of a
unique class of cases in which the claim of right-denial of admission to the state
bar-involved a matter of policy that was under the exclusive control of the court,
and therefore every such claimant would be saddled with an unfavorable state court
"judgment" (his denial of admission) before ever being able to claim that he had
been improperly denied admission).
JUDICIAL POWER
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pose of the jurisdictional limitation lead to sharply different conclusions about its proper scope.
But Feldman did not give the lower courts guidance on what policies the doctrine sought to advance. Instead, it offered federal courts
a guideline for separating a state court's judicial acts from its nonjudicial acts. Federal courts were given the following task: to decide
whether a particular state court decision
look[ed] to the future and change[d] existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those
subject to its power ... [or] involved a "judicial inquiry" in which
the court was called upon to investigate, declare, and enforce liabilities as they stood on present or past facts and under laws supposed
97
already to exist.
Lower federal courts, unsurprisingly, have had a difficult time distinguishing the general challenge from the particular inquiry, especially since even a general challenge may be barred from federal court
if it is inextricably intertwined with a particular inquiry in state court.
Ironically, in light of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine's stated goal of advancing federalism, federal courts have to delve into the nature and
content of particular state court proceedings to decide this question.
Because Rooker-Feldman is styled as jurisdictional, the federal courts
cannot inquire into whether the state proceedings were judicial under
state law, but instead must use a uniform federal standard. 98 The results, however, have been far from uniform.
In Feldman itself, the Court saw no problem with distinguishing a
general constitutional challenge to the state's bar admission rules
from a claim that the state had unlawfully denied a particular applicant admission. 99 Sometimes the claims seem to fit neatly into the
proper categories. In Van Harken v. City of Chicago'0 0 the Seventh Circuit held that a declaration that the city's parking ticket procedures
were constitutionally inadequate was not barred by Rooker-Feldman because it did not challenge the result in any particular case; however, a
suit seeking refunds of parking fines imposed on the particular plaintiffs would be barred. 0 1 The Facio0 2 case discussed by Suzanna
97 Feldman, 460 U.S. at 479 (quoting Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210,
226 (1908)).
98 See Ganry, 82 F.3d at 1367 n.8.
99 See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 485.
100 103 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1997).
101 If the result of the general challenge would be to give the plaintiff a refund,
however, the general challenge would be barred as inextricably intertwined. See id. at
1348.
102 Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 1991).
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Sherry unwittingly identifies one of the basic problems with this distinction: if the litigant cannot show that he himself will be affected by
the outcome of the general challenge, he does not have standing to
bring that challenge. If he can show that he will be affected, it may
mean that his particular claim is inextricably intertwined with his general challenge. 0 3 Apparently, the only way out of this nearly perfect
Catch-22 is for the plaintiff to allege that upholding the general challenge will not affect his particular claim in this case, but that he is
04
likelyto have a similar case in the future.
Thus, courts must determine what harms are likely to recur to the
particular plaintiff in order to determine the viability of a general
challenge under Rooker-Feldman. As similar inquiries in the standing
and abstention contexts have illustrated, 0 5 this is not a bright-line
inquiry, but an exploration rife with value-laden assumptions about
probability and human behavior. For example, it tends to block challenges to unconstitutional practices of the criminal justice system,
given the courts' unwillingness to assume that any particular plaintiff
will again violate the law and be subjected to the challenged practices. 10 6 Moreover, whether a federal plaintiffs legal challenge is seen
as particular or general will depend on the court's notoriously elastic
view of the claim itself, the substantive rights involved, and even the
court's own role.' 0 7 For example, consider the following example
103 This apparently was not a problem in Feldman because the Court viewed "inextricably intertwined" as distinct from "could have been raised." Though Feldman
could have raised the general challenge in state court, it was not intertwined with the
particular challenge. Subsequent lower courts have not been as ready to make this
distinction.
104 Hart and Wechsler asked, with apparent bemusement, whether Rooker-Feldman
should govern "as applied" challenges, while res judicata should govern facial challenges? If so, they asked, on what grounds? See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at
1503.
105 See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (holding that it was unlikely
that plaintiff would be subjected to illegal police-administered chokehold again);
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (upholding permanent injunction against
threat of repeated future prosecutions for obscuring state motto on license plate).
106 See, e.g., Lyons, 461 U.S. at 95; O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974). But see
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (denying standing to challenge deadbeat dad law on grounds that presence of law and its penalties are unlikely to lead to
compliance).
107 I have written about this elasticity in the standing area, for example. There it is
particularly problematic to the extent the denial of standing is jurisdictionally rather
than prudentially based. See Bandes, The Idea of a Case, supra note 65. For example,
in Lyons, it was not clear whether the plaintiff meant to bring a general challenge to
an ongoing police practice of choking unresisting suspects or to the fact that it was
done to him in particular. In part this was a disagreement about whether the requi-
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from the related, though nonjurisdictional, context of Younger abstention. In Gomez v. United States District Court,10 8 the Supreme Court

barred the issuance of federal injunctions based on allegations that
the manner in which the state of California executed prisoners-lethal gas-violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court refused to permit federal consideration of the issue of the constitutionality of
California's means of execution because it held that the argument
had been decided by the state court when it upheld the prisoner's
conviction. 10 9 Perhaps the Court meant to say that the claims would
be intertwined any time resolution of the federal claim would overturn the petitioner's death sentence. Thus, to gain access to the federal forum, Gomez would have needed to show that he would have
been executed despite succeeding on his federal claim.
Although dual sovereignty makes it impossible to avoid questions
of congruity between state and federal claims, in the Rooker-Feldman
context it did seem avoidable. The Feldman formulation predicted all
the ensuing problems. It seems naive and anachronistic to discuss
whether a legal ruling explains facts as they are supposed to exist, or
looks to the future. This distinction is not particularly descriptive of
the categories of legal rules. If anything, it reflects a peculiarly narrow, private law-based notion of what courts do when they decide
cases. All norm articulation affects future litigants in some sense; yet
all Article III cases, by definition, affect current litigants-and usually
with some citation to precedent. One sympathizes with the Third Circuit judge who found himself having to explain why a state court's
novel legal decision can still be adjudicative, and thus barred by
Rooker-Feldman. He explained: "When a court makes a novel legal decision, it attempts to arrive at that decision by reasoning from existing
materials. The court is making an attempt to 'say what the law is.""10
As one court ingeniously discovered, every general challenge can
be broken down into individual instances of wrongdoing. In Johnson
v. Kansas, the plaintiff alleged that the Kansas Supreme Court violated
sites of a § 1983 municipal liability claim were met, but in part it was a disagreement
about whether Lyons had a judicially cognizable interest in arguing only about his
own right not to be choked, or also about the rights of other young African-American
men in the Los Angeles area. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 95; Bandes, The Idea of the Case,
supra note 65, at 266.
108 503 U.S. 653 (1992) (per curiam). See Evan Caminker & Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Lawless Execution of Robert Alton Harris, 102 YALE L.J. 225 (1992) (discussing

Gomez).
109 See Gomez, 503 U.S. at 608.
110 Guarino v. Larsen, 11 F.3d 1151, 1157 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
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the Americans with Disabilities Act through policies, patterns, and
practices that denied admission to applicants with a history of mental
illness unless they could prove they had been cured. Though the
plaintiff thought he was making a general challenge to the state's
method of adjudicating applications, he was told that "each of the
state decisions in that alleged pattern or chain was the result of a separate state judicial proceeding adjudicating an individual application
that may not be reviewed in this court.""'
Some courts have tried to identify general challenges based on
forms of relief, finding that prospective relief encompassing all simi2
larly situated future plaintiffs does not violate Rooker-Feldman,"
though other courts have viewed such claims more skeptically as at3
tempts to circumvent the doctrine through manipulative pleading."
Unless courts receive more guidance on why it is important to
determine whether a proceeding is judicial in nature, we are likely to
see more debates like that in Bates and more results like the one in
Kamilewicz. In Bates, the Ninth Circuit needed to determine whether
the federal district court had jurisdiction over a challenge to Proposition 140 despite the fact that a state court had considered a nearly
identical challenge brought by different parties. Judge Rymer was of
the opinion that any federal court decision on the constitutionality of
the Proposition would put the federal district court on a collision
course with the state supreme court." 4 Judge Fletcher correctly
pointed out that this formulation would give state courts the power to
permanently foreclose review of state statutes in lower federal courts.
She argued that the doctrine is instead about the integrity of individual judgments that bind particular parties and should only preclude
federal review of such judgments. 1 5 Judge Rymer's formulation
would have devastating consequences for litigant access to federal
court and for federal oversight of state court protection of constitutional rights. But without a more nuanced understanding of the evils
the doctrine seeks to prevent, it is difficult to assert with conviction
that she misinterpreted the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Does the doctrine mean to prevent federal intrusion into states' autonomy to issue

111 Johnson v. Kansas, 888 F. Supp. 1037, 1083-84 (D. Kan. 1995).

112

See Kirby v. Philadelphia, 995 F. Supp. 225 (E.D. Pa. 1995).

113

See Stem v. Nix, 840 F.2d 208, 212 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that plaintiff's gen-

eral challenge was simply a skillful attempt to mask the true purpose of the action).
114
115

See Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843, 856 (9th Cir. 1997) (Rymer, J., concurring).
See id. at 862-63 (Fletcher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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judgments affecting particular parties or into their autonomy to decide issues of state concern? 116
Kamilewicz raises another problem with interpreting the reach of
the 'judicial act" requirement. Kamilewicz grew out of a state class action suit. In the federal suit, the class members sued (among other
defendants) their state court attorneys for fraud and malpractice.
The Seventh Circuit held that a state court postsettlement fairness
hearing was a judicial proceeding, and therefore federal claims alleging that the attorneys had obtained the settlement through malpracl1 7
tice and fraudulent misrepresentations to their clients were barred.
Judge Easterbrook reasonably suggested that the mere fact that misconduct took place in the context of a judicial proceeding hardly
seemed a good reason to insulate it from federal review. He argued
that based on this reasoning, if the state court judgment was unreliable because of attorney bungling, the bungler would be able to point
to the adverse judgment itself to ward off his client's claims.11 , Or as
Judge Posner put it in another case: "Otherwise there would be no
federal remedy for a violation of federal rights whenever the violator
so far succeeded in corrupting the state judicial process as to obtain a
favorable judgment ....,,119 But without a theory that explains the

importance of the 'Judicial proceeding" requirement, the outrageous
result in Kamilewicz could easily be replicated. 120 Taken to the extreme, such an interpretation of § 1257 and its federalism component
supports the notion that if a state court decision results from a corrup116

See, e.g., Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 467 (11th Cir. 1996). The court in

Powell held that Rooker-Feldman applies for reasons that go to the heart of our system
of federalism-the dual dignity of state and federal court decisions interpreting federal law. It stated that in our federal system, a state trial court's interpretation of

federal law is no less authoritative than that of the federal court of appeals in whose
circuit the trial court is located. See id. (citing Lockhart v. Fretwell, 504 U.S. 908
(1992)).
117 Perhaps, as Judge Easterbrook argued in dissent from the denial of rehearing
en banc, a settlement followed by a fairness hearing is more like a contract than like
litigation. See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston, 100 F.3d 1348, 1352 (7th Cir. 1996).
118 See id. at 1348 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
119 Nesses v.Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003, 1005 (7th Cir. 1995). Significantly, the
Supreme Court has sometimes taken a broader view of its jurisdiction in the direct
appeal context. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981). In Wood, the Court vacated convictions based on the fact that the litigants had been represented below by
attorneys with a potential conflict of interests with possible due process implications.
The Court decided the issue although it had not been raised in state court. See HART
AND WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 570.
120 See Guarino v. Larsen, 11 F.3d 1151, 1159 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993) (recognizing the

problem with permitting a state court to make an unreviewable decision about the
legality of its own personnel action, but finding that result consistent with Feldman).
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tion of the judicial process, the state court is fully capable of cleaning
its own house. 121 Or failing that, the Supreme Court is available, theoretically at least, to bring order. 12 2 Although Sherry treats attorney
malpractice as a special problem raised by Rooker-Feldman, the problem is more basic than special. Why should federal courts defer to
state judicial proceedings? What does 28 U.S.C. § 1257 tell us about
why this deference is necessary? Merely pronouncing a state proceeding 'judicial in nature" and citing vague policies in favor of deference
leaves too much unanswered.
B. Inextricably Intertwined
The second difficulty raised by Feldman's extension of Rocker is
that it is now necessary to determine not just which claims were decided in state court, but which were inextricably intertwined with
those that were decided. As mentioned, Feldman itself gives little guidance, mentioning the requirement only briefly in a footnote. Justice
Marshall attempted a definition in his Pennzoil v. Texas123 concurrence, saying "a federal claim is inextricably intertwined . . .if the

federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly
decided the issues before it.' ' 124 Nevertheless, federal courts have
found the standard difficult to apply, 2 5 as even a cursory review of the
resulting precedent will reflect.
Most circuits have adopted rules barring suit where a federal
judgment would reverse, effectively nullify, or vacate the state court
121 SeeJohnson v. Kansas, 888 F. Supp. 1073, 1085 (D. Kan. 1995). In Johnson, the
court opined: "That a state's highest court would knowingly violate a federal law and
then would actively coneal its violation seems such an unlikely proposition that it
hardly warrants discussion, let alone being cause for exercising jurisdiction in the face
of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine." Id.
122 Judge Easterbrook argued that the litigants did not even have an opportunity
to raise many of their claims in state court since they were unaware of them. The
federal district court addressed that argument by holding that the litigants could
bring their new allegations back to state court to obtain relief. See Kamilewicz v. Bank
of Boston, No. 95C6341, 1995 WL 758422, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 1995). Many,
though not all, federal courts would find the doctrine inapplicable when the federal
plaintiff could not have raised the claim in state court, despite the fact that it was
intertwined with a claim that was raised. See Wood v. Orange County, 715 F.2d 1543
(l1th Cir. 1983) (explaining that in such a case there can be no appeal in the state
court system, since the claim could not have been raised in state court).
123 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
124 Id. at 25 (Marshall, J., concurring).
125 See, e.g., Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that no
bright line separates federal claims that are intertwined with state courtjudgments
from those that are not); Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d 1429, 1433

(10th Cir. 1984) (expressing the same view).
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judgment. But, like the judicial proceeding requirement, the "inextricably intertwined" requirement is not a bright-line rule. It depends
largely on the reading of the complaint. To take a prosaic example,
consider a couple of the many federal cases seeking to litigate issues
arising from state zoning or condemnation decisions. In Centres v.
Town of Brookfield,126 the state court upheld the town board's denial of
a building permit. The plaintiff brought a takings claim in federal
court, which held Rooker-Feldman inapplicable, finding that the plaintiff was complaining of an injury at the hands of the defendant rather
than at the hands of the state court, and thus his federal claim was not
inextricably intertwined with the state court decision.1 27 Compare
Gany v. Geils,128 in which the state court granted a condemnation order and plaintiffs sued in federal court alleging the order had been
politically motivated. The federal suit was held barred by Rooker-Feldman. The court reasoned that the retaliation injury only became complete when the state ordered the condemnation, and therefore the
harm of which the plaintiff complained was inextricably intertwined
with the state courtjudgment. Is the question whether the state court
implicitly decided the federal issue (and that therefore its decision
must be respected) or whether the state judgment ought to remain
intact in the face of the federal ruling, regardless of what issues were
actually decided? Which, if either, of these formulations is consistent
with the rationale that federal district courts cannot hear state court
appeals? Unfortunately, it appears that such a narrow and defensible
rationale was lost when Rooker itself was extended beyond reconsideration of the identical case.
There are difficult questions about how broadly to construe the
notion that the federal decision cannot nullify the state decision.
Kamilewicz again provides a worst-case scenario. The Seventh Circuit
found that state court approval of a settlement, which included approval of attorney fees, was inextricably intertwined with the questions
of whether the attorneys or the bank had committed fraud, malpractice, or breach of fiduciary duty in their representations to the court
and the plaintiffs. It reasoned that any federal holding for the plaintiffs would call into question the state court conclusion that the fees
were reasonable. It is therefore quite possible for a claim substantially
unrelated to those raised in state court to call into question the federaljudgment. To bar federal consideration of such claims cuts a sig126 148 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 1998). The federal district court dismissed on the
ground that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted.
127 See id.
128 82 F.3d 1362 (7th Cir. 1996).
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nificant swath through lower federal court jurisdiction. It also bears
little resemblance to the notion of a direct appeal of issues raised
below.
Lower courts applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as I mentioned above, often seem to assume a kind of bad faith among wouldbe federal plaintiffs. 12 9 Although the federal cases are rife with comments about howjurisdictionally inflexible and mandatory the inquiry
must be, these courts lace their determinations with a certain ill-defined version of federalism that weighs heavily against federal jurisdiction. They are apt to look at all sorts of disparate state and federal
claims as intertwined and interchangeable and to assume that federal
and state courts are also interchangeable. For example, in the Republic of Paraguay3 0° case discussed by Sherry, in which Paraguay filed a
federal suit alleging that the state of Virginia violated certain treaties
when it tried and convicted a Paraguayan national, it is not at all clear
that the defendant's arguments against the constitutionality of his
conviction and sentence were completely congruent with the interests
of the republic in maintaining international respect for its treaties,
despite the fact that the result of accepting Paraguay's argument
would have meant reversal of the defendant's conviction. The facile
conflation of state and federal claims is troubling.13 1 As the Second
Circuit observed in the Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.13 2 case, most § 1983
claims could be raised in a related state proceeding. 3 3 Most federal
claims have some state law analogue, but violations of the federal Constitution are not interchangeable with state wrongs. 3 4 When federal
claims are too easily conflated with state claims, it becomes too easy to
assume that the state forum is adequate to address them.
129 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. In the Northern District of Illinois' opinion in Kamilewicz, the court says: "Even though their request for relief is
dressed up as damages under RICO, § 1983, or for attorney malpractice, the plaintiffs
are asking us to undo what the Alabama court did, and that constitutes a [sic] impermissible collateral attack upon the state court judgment." Kamilewicz, 1995 WL
758422, at *5.
130 949 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1996).
131 See Aiona v. Judiciary of Haw., 17 F.3d 1244, 1250 n.10 (9th Cir. 1994) (dismissing on Rooker-Feldman grounds, and without elaboration, a federal class action suit
challenging the administrative procedures used following arrests for driving while
intoxicated).
132 784 F.2d 1133, 1144 (2d Cir. 1986).
133 See id.
134 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961);
Bandes, supra note 66, at 325.
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However, what is most troubling is that many dismissals under
Rooker-Feldman contain no reasoning. For example, in Davis v. Allen

County,1 35 an unpublished disposition, the federal plaintiff, whose parental rights had been terminated in state court, filed a § 1983 suit
alleging that the state department of welfare had discriminated
against him because of his gender. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the
case on Rooker-Feldman grounds. Here is the federal court's complete
exegesis of the claim:
Although the equal protection claim is distinct from the state court
judgment, it is "inextricably intertwined" with the state court judgment and the district court also 1 36 lacked jurisdiction over that
claim. [Citations omitted.] Because the federal courts do not have
jurisdiction over this case, it should have been dismissed for lack of
13 7
subject matter jurisdiction.
Perhaps the court was correct, but who's to know? Many of the
opinions contain little discussion of the respective interests at stake in
the state and federal cases. The need to determine whether federal
and state claims are congruent arises in many intersystemic contexts,
and the difficulties in making such distinctions are endemic. 138 The
danger of wrongly conflating federal and state claims always exists in
the intersystemic context, but the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has features
that exacerbate it-its status as jurisdictionally inflexible, its amorphous relationship to federalism, and its insufficient articulation that
makes unprincipled application too easy.
C. Federalism
Lower courts applying the doctrine tend to elide the fact that federalism runs two ways and that sometimes there is a valuable purpose
135 Davis v. Allen County Office of Family and Children, 114 F.3d 1191 (7th Cir.
1997).
136 The court had just dismissed another claim-that the caseworker had falsified
documents-on Rooker-Feldman grounds, with only slightly more reasoning.
137 Davis, 114 F.3d at 1191.
138 In the preclusion context, we have seen that even claims within exclusively
federal jurisdiction, such as antitrust claims, may have state tort counterparts. See
Marresse v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985). Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), has made it necessary for federal courts to determine
whether a § 1983 suit for damages brought by a state prisoner is one which implies
the invalidity of his conviction or sentence, a distinction which is by no means obvious. See HART & WECHSLER, supranote 4, at 1513 (referring to the difficult questions
raised by the Heck opinion); see also Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140
(1988) (finding that the relitigation exception to the anti-injunction act requires determination that the claims the injunction is sought to insulate have actually been
decided by the state court).
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to be served by providing a federal forum for the litigation of federal
claims. Moreover, access to the federal forum is itself ofjurisdictional
magnitude. Professor Chang argued that Rooker-Feldman must trump
§ 1983, since the latter is not jurisdictional. 139 But the landscape is
more complicated than he believes. First, as I mentioned above, Article III creates the federal forum and gives it attributes and protections
that enable it to safeguard constitutional rights.' 40 Second, § 1331
and § 1343, the jurisdictional vehicles for federal question claims, reflect a congressional determination that a federal forum is necessary
to supplement inadequate state remedies for the violation of federal
rights.' 41 Finally, the congressional intent behind § 1983 cannot be so
neatly separated from the jurisdictional directives of § 1331 and
§ 1343. Most federal claims, in the current understanding, cannot be
raised without a statutory cause of action. 142 Section 1983 provides
that cause of action in the vast majority of cases. As Professor Redish
observed, there are important interrelationships between congressional jurisdictional allocations and substantive congressional programs, and the former can be improperly thwarted by disregarding
the latter.143 The civil rights amendments and their effectuating statutes were together intended to effect a historic forum reallocation; to
establish the federal government as a guarantor of basic federal individual rights against incursions by state power, and to vest individuals
with three kinds of protection against state governments: federal
rights, federal remedies, and federal forums.'4 Thus, it is incorrect
and dangerous to style the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as a jurisdictional
imperative that does not need to be reconciled with any conflicting,
equally powerful imperatives.
The general assumption that has governed the difficult management of dual sovereignty has been the assumption of mandatory concurrent jurisdiction. A litigant may pursue identical claims in state
139 See Chang, supra note 13, at 1367.
140 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
141 See Currie, supra note 17, at 320; supra note 26 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1331
and § 1343).
142 See generally Bandes, supra note 66.
143 See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE PoLTcIAL ORDER 72-73
(1991). Chang argued that Mitchum v. Foster,407 U.S. 228 (1972), did not create an
exception to, or modify, § 1331 or § 1343. He neglected to mention that it treated
these sections in conjunction with § 1983 as creating a federal forum for the protection of federal rights. See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242.
144 See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503 (1982); Mitchum, 407 U.S. at
242; Bandes, Unauthorized Act, supra note 65, at 123; Justice Harry Blackmun, Section
1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade
Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 6 (1985).
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and federal courts, absent exceptional circumstances. 145 He generally

may not obtain two conflicting judgments on the same claim, but that
is due mainly to nonjurisdictional preclusion doctrines, with their
concerns about fairness, judicial economy, and vexatious litigation.
Sections 1331, 1343 and 1983, as interpreted in Monroe v. Pape146 and
Patsy v. Board of Regents,14 7 establish the jurisdiction, the cause of action, and the congressional intent for supplementary state and federal
relief on the same federal claim, without a requirement that state remedies be exhausted. There are statutory and prudential limitations on
this general rule. Congress has not carved out a blanket civil rights
exception to the Full Faith and Credit Act, and therefore a civil rights
plaintiff may sometimes litigate in two forums, but his first judgment
will generally be preclusive. 148 Because the Full Faith and Credit Act
is not jurisdictional, Congress has the power to craft exceptions as it
sees fit, depending on the particular federal statute and state interests
at issue.
Though the Anti-Injunction Act provides a jurisdictional barrier
to federal injunctions against ongoing state proceedings, it also provides a jurisdictional exception for § 1983 claims. 149 It thus attempts
to reconcile the conflicting imperatives of state autonomy and the enforcement of federal rights. Though many § 1983 equitable actions
are nevertheless barred, the barrier is prudential rather than jurisdictional.'5 0 The prudential nature of the bar permits consideration of
the particular state and federal interests at stake.
This is not to suggest that either the courts or Congress have the
formula just right. Rather, the point is that congressional and judicial
articulating and weighing of competing interests is occurring, and
must occur, in order to achieve the delicate and shifting balance
among the statutory and prudential limits on concurrent jurisdiction.
This is particularly important if we are to reconcile § 1983's prefer145

See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1

(1983); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
(1976).

146 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
147 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
148 See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
149

See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).

150

See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (establishing prudential bar

against federal injunction of ongoing state criminal proceedings, but also establishing
exceptions to that bar); Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (extending Younger
to some civil actions); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (further extending Younger); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491
U.S. 350 (1989) (declining to extend Younger).
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ence for the federal forum in civil rights cases with due respect for
state autonomy. Rooker-Feldman is an irresistible and illegitimate invitation to federal courts to upset the balance. It requires exhaustion of
state remedies without any attempt to reconcile the conflict with
§ 1983's guarantee of a federal remedy supplementary to any state
remedy. It is in potential conflict with the Colorado River assumption
of concurrent jurisdiction15 1 and with Mitchum v. Fosters holding that
there is no jurisdictional bar to federal injunctions against state court
judgments. 5 2 It extinguishes federal claims based on vague assertions
of state competence and cumbersome, poorly articulated tests that
have received little more than a footnote from the Supreme Court.
Rooker-Feldman encourages jurisdictional helplessness, because it
offers federal courts the option of lightening their docket without taking the responsibility for ousting any particular federal claimant. The
refusal ofjurisdiction is often accompanied by the jurisdictional shrug
that says "What could I do? The doctrine is mandatory." All that is
lacking is a convincing explanation.

151
152

See, e.g., Randolph v. Lipscher, 641 F. Supp. 767, 781 (D.NJ. 1986).
See Thompson, supra note 4, at 889.
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